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COMMENT
FOOD LABELING AND THE CONSUMER’S RIGHT TO
KNOW: GIVE THE PEOPLE WHAT THEY WANT1
David Alan Nauheim†
ABSTRACT
The average consumer would be surprised to find out that much of the
food he buys has been irradiated, genetically modified, or cloned, or that it
contains ingredients not listed on the label. Most consumers would believe
that they have a “right to know” facts like this about the food they buy. The
U.S. Supreme Court seems to agree. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
the Court said that:
The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good. That teaching
applies equally to state attempts to deprive consumers of
accurate information about their chosen products: . . . “Some of
the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But the
general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the
government, assess the value of the information presented.”
However the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) disagrees. Despite
strong consumer interest, it refuses to mandate labeling of Genetically
Modified foods or milk from cows injected with Recombinant Bovine
Growth Hormone, and it has proposed eliminating mandatory labeling of
irradiated foods.
The FDA argues that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”) does not give the FDA the authority to mandate labeling based
on consumer interest. This interpretation has been upheld by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala. The
court upheld the FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA based on the deference
1 “Give the People What They Want” is the title of a 1981 album by the English rock
group The Kinks.
† Associate at The Blair Firm, Seattle, Washington; Editor-in-Chief, Liberty
University Law Review, Volume 3; J.D., Liberty University School of Law, 2009; M.A.T.,
Johns Hopkins University, 2004; B.A., Whitman College, 1996. This Comment is dedicated
to my wife Colleen, whose love and support have propelled my life to levels I never before
thought possible.
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that courts must afford to an agency’s interpretation of its own enabling
statute. However, the D.C. Circuit did not consider whether consumers have
a First Amendment right to receive accurate non-misleading information
about food. Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that such a right exists.
This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit wrongly decided Alliance for
Bio-Integrity. This Comment argues that the FDA should consider what a
consumer reasonably wants to know when deciding what kind of
information a food label must contain. This Comment concludes that the
best way to vindicate the consumer’s right to know is for Congress to
amend the FDCA to require that regulators take into account the extent to
which the labeling fails to reveal material facts that consumers reasonably
desire.
Scientists will continue to develop more ways to manipulate food. These
new technologies will continue to raise religious, moral, ethical, health, and
safety issues. The consumers’ right to know about their food will be an
increasingly important issue. While mandatory labeling is often contrary to
the interests of the food industry, this Comment argues the U.S.
Constitution has made the choice for us—the First Amendment requires
that government protect the consumers’ right to receive accurate nonmisleading information that they reasonably desire.
I. INTRODUCTION
A health-conscious consumer fills her grocery cart with what she thinks
is healthy food—milk, corn, salmon, meat, potatoes, canola oil, almonds,
and spinach. What she does not know is that her “healthy” food includes
plants that have been genetically modified, a process which may have
introduced unknown allergens and toxins. She does not know that her
vegetables have been irradiated with ionizing radiation one million times
more powerful than medical X-rays, destroying some of the nutritional
content and causing chemical by-products that might cause cancer. She also
does not realize that her milk contains antibiotics and growth hormones that
may threaten her family’s health. She does not know this because the labels
do not say so. They do not say so because neither federal law nor state law
requires food labels to contain the kind of information that most consumers
would want to know.
This Comment will argue that consumers have a right to know what is in
their food and that the current statutory and regulatory scheme should be
amended to protect that right. Part II will set out the justification for the
consumer’s right to know and give examples of significant facts about food
that the current regime does not require to appear on labels. Part III will
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detail the current statutory and regulatory scheme and the case law that
interprets it. Part IV will demonstrate that the FDA has authority to
mandate food labeling based solely on the consumer’s right to know, and it
will also critique lower courts’ decisions failing to require the FDA to so
mandate. Part V will propose that Congress amend the FDCA so that a label
will be deemed misleading unless it contains all of the information about a
food product that an ordinary consumer would want to know. Part V will
then address anticipated criticisms of that proposal. Part VI concludes this
Comment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Consumer’s Right To Know
That a consumer has the right to know what is in his food seems so
evident that it does not need to be supported. However, a consumer’s
interest is sometimes contrary to the interests of industry and receives little
weight from labeling regulators.2 Thus, it is necessary to state the
justification for the consumer’s right to know.
A consumer’s right to know is a part of a larger concept of health
freedom. If we do not know what is in our food, how can we make healthy
food choices?
At least some of the Founding Fathers were concerned that the
government would restrict health freedom. Thomas Jefferson believed that
the people—not the government—should make their own decisions about
diet and medicine. He wrote, “Was the government to prescribe to us our
medicine and diet, our bodies would be in such keeping as our souls are
now.”3 He also believed that government is not an elite group, who should
decide what is best for society. Instead, the people should be informed so
that they can make their own choices. He wrote, “I know no safe depository
of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we
think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with wholesome

2. “The issue of labeling genetically modified foods is centered on the tension between
a consumer’s right to know and the bioengineering industry’s interest in not labeling.”
Matthew Rich, The Debate over Genetically Modified Crops in the United States:
Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 889,
904 (2004).
3. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William Peden ed., Univ. of
N.C. Press 1955) (1853).
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discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their
discretion by education.”4
Dr. Benjamin Rush,5 a physician and a founding father, reportedly
believed that the U.S. Constitution should contain protections for health
freedom:
Unless we put medical freedom into the Constitution, the time
will come when medicine will organize itself into an undercover
dictatorship. To restrict the art of healing to one class of men and
deny equal privileges to others will constitute the Bastille of
medical science. All such laws are un-American and despotic.6
Dr. Rush was referring to a monopoly on the practice of medicine, but
the concept of health freedom—that the people should have the right to
control their own health choices (and by implication their diet)—was
implicit in his concern.
Many judicial pronouncements support the consumer’s right to know.
Justice Scalia wrote, “The premise of the First Amendment is that the
American people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of
considering both the substance of the speech presented to them and its
proximate and ultimate source.”7 Justice Stevens wrote:
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either
deception or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the
offensive assumption that the public will respond “irrationally”
to the truth. The First Amendment directs us to be especially
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good. That

4. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161 (Paul L. Ford ed., G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1899).
5. Dr. Benjamin Rush was a physician and a signer of the Declaration of
Independence. BENJAMIN RUSH, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN RUSH: HIS TRAVELS
THROUGH LIFE TOGETHER WITH HIS COMMONPLACE BOOK FOR 1789-1813 (Greenwood Press
1970) (1948).
6. The author was unable to locate the exact source of this quotation, but this quotation
is traditionally attributed to Dr. Rush. See, e.g., Christopher Mills, Comment, Mainstreaming
the Alternatives When Complementary and Alternative Medicines Become Westernized, 13
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 775, 793 (2003).
7. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 258-59 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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teaching applies equally to state attempts to deprive consumers
of accurate information about their chosen products . . . .8
And most famously, Justice Jackson wrote, “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”9
Three principles are clear in these three pronouncements:
(1) It is not government’s role to decide what truth is.
(2) The people are capable of deciding truth themselves.
(3) Government should not keep information from the people.
Yet with food labeling policy, the government is doing just that—deciding
what the truth is and keeping the public in the dark “for their own good.”
There have been several recent attempts in the U.S. to protect the
consumer’s right to know. In 1962, President Kennedy sent Congress a
“special message” declaring four basic consumer rights: the right to safety,
the right to be informed, the right to choose, and the right to be heard.10 In
1980, California passed Proposition 65, which requires disclosure of
carcinogens in consumer products.11 Congress has given teeth to the “right
to know” in some non-food contexts. For example, the Freedom of
Information Act requires the U.S. Government to disclose information upon
a written request, unless one of nine exceptions applies.12 The Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act requires industry to report
certain spills of toxic chemicals.13
In the food context, however, consumer rights bills have failed to gain
traction in Congress.14 Under current federal law, a food label need only
contain five things: the ingredients, the net weight, the name and address of
the manufacturer, the name of the food, and certain nutritional
8. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (citations omitted).
9. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
10. Steve Keane, Can a Consumer’s Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The Case of
Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291 (2006).
11. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 25249.5-25249.13 (West 2005).
12. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1552 (2009) (codified in scattered sections
of Title 5).
13. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11021
(2009).
14. See, e.g., Produce Consumers’ Right-to-Know Act, H.R. 1605, 107th Cong. (2001);
Food Ingredient Right to Know Act, H.R. 1356, 107th Cong. (2001); Genetically Engineered
Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 5269, 109th Cong. (2006).
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information.15 Currently, the FDA claims that it does not have authority to
mandate labeling based on consumer interest alone.16
B. What You Don’t Know Might Hurt You: Examples of the FDA’s
Labeling Policy
This Part will look next at three controversial food technologies and the
FDA’s response to consumer demands for mandatory labeling of these
technologies. Each of these food technologies is controversial for either
safety, health, environmental, ethical, or religious reasons. In each of these
examples, the FDA has ultimately sided with industry, concluding that there
are no safety concerns, and that the FDA does not have the authority under
the FDCA to mandate labeling.
1. Genetically Modified Organisms
Genetically Modified Organism (“GMO”) is the name for what is created
when a segment of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (“DNA”) from one organism “is
extracted and spliced into a recipient organism’s preexisting DNA.”17 This
is done in order to introduce a favorable trait from one organism into
another.18 DNA “can come from any organism,” whether it is “microbial,
animal, or plant.”19 Scientists have, for example, developed GMOs that
resist pests and disease better than conventional crops.20
Fifty-four percent of Americans say they have never eaten GMOs.21
However, given that approximately seventy percent of processed foods in
the U.S. contain GMOs, they are probably mistaken.22 Many Americans are
15. See Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label, in LABELING GENETICALLY
MODIFIED FOOD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 17, 18-19 (Paul Weirich ed.,
2007). Mr. Degnan is a partner with King & Spalding, which represents some of the giants
in the food and pharmaceutical industry—which may explain his sympathy for the FDA’s
pro-industry policies. Kate & Spalding, Biography of Frederick Degnan,
http://www.kslaw.com/bio/Frederick_Degnan (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
16. See, e.g., Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1193 (W.D. Wis. 1995). This
Comment will argue that the FDA does have that authority. See infra Part III.B.
17. Matthew Rich, supra note 2, at 890.
18. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
22,986 (FDA May 29, 1992).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. W.K. KELLOGG FOUNDATION, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. FOOD SYSTEM: WHAT AND
HOW AMERICANS THINK ABOUT THEIR FOOD 18 (2005) [hereinafter KELLOGG REPORT].
22. Robert Streiffer & Alan Rubel, Genetically Engineered Animals and the Ethics of
Food Labeling, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL
DEBATE 61, 66 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007).
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not aware of this fact, however, because the labels do not tell them—under
current regulations, GMO labeling is voluntary.23
Only thirty-two percent of Americans consider themselves
knowledgeable about GMOs.24 Nevertheless, a plurality (forty-seven
percent) oppose the introduction of GMOs into the food supply, and a
majority (fifty-two percent) say they are unlikely to eat GMOs.25 Many
consumers “are willing to pay [a substantial] premium for non-GM[O]
foods.”26 While most Americans do not know very much about GMOs,
GMOs make them “cautious and uncomfortable.”27
Why are consumers concerned? Some (thirty-seven percent) object to
GMOs on religious grounds.28 Gene splicing appears to violate Old
Testament biblical laws.29 Bioengineering also seems to usurp God’s role as
the Creator.30 Some just think it is immoral to play God with nature.31
23. “We are, therefore, reaffirming our decision to not require special labeling of all
bioengineered foods.” Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether
Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering; Availability, 66 Fed. Reg.
4839, 4840 (FDA Jan. 18, 2001).
24. KELLOGG REPORT, supra note 21, at 16.
25. Id. at 18.
26. Philip G. Peters & Thomas A. Lambert, Regulatory Barriers to Consumer
Information about Genetically Modified Foods, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD,
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 151, 157 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007).
27. KELLOGG REPORT, supra note 21, at 17.
28. Id. at 21; see Leviticus 19:19 (“Do not mate different kinds of animals.”);
Deuteronomy 22:9 (“Do not plant two kinds of seed in your vineyard; if you do, not only the
crops you plant but also the fruit of the vineyard will be defiled.”).
29. Leviticus 19:19 (“Do not mate different kinds of animals.”); Deuteronomy 22:9
(“Do not plant two kinds of seed in your vineyard; if you do, not only the crops you plant but
also the fruit of the vineyard will be defiled.”). But see Carl Feit, Genetically Modified Food
and Jewish Law (Halakhah), in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: DEBATING BIOTECHNOLOGY
123 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002).
30. Genesis 1:1 (“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.”); see also
Thomas O. McGarity, Consumer Sovereignty, Federal Regulation, and Industry Control in
Marketing and Choosing Food in the United States, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED
FOOD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 128, 134 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007). But see
Joe N. Perry, Genetically Modified Crops, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: DEBATING
BIOTECHNOLOGY 115, 115-21 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002).
31. See, e.g., HRH The Prince of Wales, Reith Lecture 2000, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED
FOODS: DEBATING BIOTECHNOLOGY 11 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002).
The idea that there is a sacred trust between mankind and our Creator, under
which we accept a duty of stewardship for the earth, has been an important
feature of most religious and spiritual thought throughout the ages. Even those
whose beliefs have not included the existence of a Creator have, nevertheless,
adopted a similar position on moral and ethical grounds.
Id. at 12.
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Most (seventy-one percent), however, say that their view of GMOs is
determined by GMOs’ effect on their family.32 This may be an expression
of concern about the safety of GMOs; twenty-seven percent of consumers
believe that GMOs are “unsafe,” and forty-two percent express “no
opinion” on the question.33
The FDA states that it is “not aware of any information showing that
foods derived by [bioengineering] . . . present any different or greater safety
concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding.”34 However,
given the government’s track record on protecting consumer safety,
consumers can be forgiven for having a “well-founded skepticism” of the
FDA’s assurance.35
Critics point out that the FDA’s claim that “there is no evidence of an
adverse effect” is not the same as stating “there is no effect.”36 Critics also
point out that researchers who dare to publish studies contrary to the
commercial interest of industry do so at great peril.37 Ironically, at the same
time that the FDA declared the “safety” of GMOs, it also admitted that it
was “unaware of any practical method to predict or assess the potential for
new proteins in food to induce allergenicity . . . .”38

32. KELLOGG REPORT, supra note 21, at 22.
33. Id. at 18.
34. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
22,991 (FDA May 29, 1992).
35. McGarity, supra note 30, at 133. “A consumer who knows nothing about genetic
engineering may know a lot about how ‘miracle’ drugs have caused catastrophic injuries,
how nuclear power created a legacy of radioactive waste, and how the kudzu plan that was
imported as an erosion control tool has taken over the rural South.” Id.; see also Int’l Dairy
Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 76-77 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996) (Leval, J., dissenting)
(“[T]here are many possible reasons why a government agency might fail to find real health
risks, including inadequate time and budget for testing, insufficient advancement of
scientific techniques, insufficiently large sampling populations, pressures from industry, and
simple human error. . . . In studying the frequency and seriousness of risks identified after
approval, GAO found that of the 198 drugs approved by FDA between 1976 and 1985 for
which data were available, 102 (or 51.5 percent) had serious postapproval risks, as
evidenced by labeling changes or withdrawal from the market.”).
36. Carl Cranor, Different Conceptions of Food Labels and Acceptable Risks, in
LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 201, 206
(Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002).
37. See, e.g., STEVEN P. MCGRIFFEN, BIOTECHNOLOGY: CORPORATE POWER VERSUS THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 56-62 (2005) (detailing the intimidation, vilification, abuse, and ostracism
of researchers who dare to challenge industry, as well as the immense influence industry
wields over universities).
38. 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,987.
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Critics also point out that food regulators do not require extensive testing
of GMOs, as they do for chemical additives.39 Instead, food regulators
“[rely] on the doctrine of “substantial equivalence” to bypass the need for
extensive testing.”40 Essentially, the FDA “concluded that if a [GMO] is
“substantially equivalent” to a non-GMO food that has a history of safe use,
the [GMO] should not be regulated any more stringently” than the nonGMO food “simply because it is a product of bio-technology.”41 This policy
is based on the assumption (instead of requiring evidence) that if a gene
was safe in one plant, it “will be safe when transferred” via biotechnology
“to another plant.”42
Critics respond that GMOs are “sui generis,” and they therefore reject
the FDA’s substantial equivalence theory.43 They point out that the
regulators are charged with promoting U.S. agricultural products as well as
regulating them.44 This conflict of interest calls into question the regulator’s
judgments about “equivalence” and “substantiality.”45 The Department of
Agriculture has spent $250 million to develop and promote agricultural
biotechnology, and only $1.6 million—less than one percent of the total—
“was put into assessing the risks.”46
In fact, there are valid reasons to be concerned about the safety of
GMOs. When genes are spliced to create GMOs, unexpected toxins or
allergens can be created.47 “Genetic engineering crosses genes between
unrelated species” that would not, and could not, crossbreed in nature.48 It is
difficult to know “whether a protein introduced into a food by genetic
engineering is a potential allergen.”49 Unforeseen, harmful mutations are

39. McGarity, supra note 30, at 131.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Cranor, supra note 36, at 201.
43. McGarity, supra note 30, at 131.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. MARK SCHAPIRO, EXPOSED: THE TOXIC CHEMISTRY OF EVERYDAY PRODUCTS AND
WHAT’S AT STAKE FOR AMERICAN POWER 90 (2007).
47. See, e.g., Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C.
2000).
48. Brian Tokar, Genetic Engineering Is Too Dangerous to Be Used in Human Foods,
in FOOD: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 120, 120 (Jan Grover ed., 2008).
49. Bob B. Buchanan, Genetic Engineering and the Allergy Issue, in GENETICALLY
MODIFIED FOODS: DEBATING BIOTECHNOLOGY 213, 214 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds.,
2002).
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more likely to occur with bioengineering than with traditional
crossbreeding.50
In one case, soya beans crossed with brazil nuts caused “allergic
reactions in people sensitive to the nuts.”51 In another case, over 37 people
were killed and 1500 were permanently disabled by a disease outbreak
traced to a food supplement produced with GMO bacteria.52 The food
supplement contained less than 0.1% of the toxic compound.53 The U.S.
Government declared that the GMO was not the cause, but the company
involved blamed the GMO because the toxin was never found in the
company’s non-GMO version of the product.54
Changes in toxicity are also a concern. GMOs are sometimes specifically
engineered to maximize their toxicity.55 For example, it is considered
desirable to make certain crops toxic to harmful pests.56 It is not hard to
imagine that this toxicity could also be a safety concern to humans.57 Also,
bioengineering can “inadvertently produce a plant in which the levels or
bioavailability of important nutrients are altered in significant ways that
could be harmful to human health.”58
Some consumers oppose GMOs because of their risk to the environment.
GMOs, through cross-fertilization, cross-pollinate indigenous native plants,
diminishing biodiversity.59 Cross-pollination from GMOs also threatens
organic farmers. Once an organic crop is cross-pollinated with GMOs, it
cannot be sold under an organic label. An organic farmer whose crop is
crossbred with GMOs can no longer market his crop as organic, which
destroys his investment and can result in financial disaster.60
Another concern is that an herbicide-resistant/pest-resistant GMO could
crossbreed with a weed, creating an unstoppable “super-weed.”61
Herbicide-resistant GMOs also raise another concern. The ability to clear
fields of all weeds using herbicides that can be sprayed directly on
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Peters & Lambert, supra note 26, at 168.
Tokar, supra note 48, at 120.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McGarity, supra note 30, at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 132-33.
See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 87-88.
Norman C. Ellstrand, When Transgenes Wander, Should We Worry?, in
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: DEBATING BIOTECHNOLOGY 325, 326 (Michael Ruse &
David Castle eds., 2002).
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herbicide-resistant GMOs will result in farmlands devoid of wildlife,
jeopardizing birds and plants that depend on farmland for habitat.62
Perhaps the most frightening environmental threat from GMOs is the
possibility that a virus will be inadvertently inserted into a GMO, resulting
in a super-virus that could wipe out crops or cause human and animal
disease of tremendous power.63
Ironically, despite the benefits of GMOs touted by their proponents,
GMOs have proven a financial disaster for American farmers. American
agriculture, once called the “breadbasket of the world,” could now be called
a “basket case.” In 1996, prior to the widespread introduction of GMOs, the
U.S. exported 3.15 million metric tons of corn to the (then) fifteen member
states of the European Union (“EU”).64 In 2005, that number had dropped
to 33,000 metric tons—a ninety percent reduction. As less corn is exported,
inventory of unsold corn rises, resulting in reduced corn prices.65 By one
estimate, American corn farmers are losing at least $200 million a year.66
As prices drop, farmers are compensated, at least in part, by $35 billion
in subsidies provided by the Commodity Credit Corporation.67 This
amounts to a personal subsidy by every American to the biotechnology
industry.68
Concern about GMOs caused the EU and the United Kingdom to put a
moratorium on GMOs in 1996.69 Today the EU requires labeling for any
food in which 0.9% of the ingredients have been genetically engineered.70
Some nations have rejected food aid out of concern that it may contain
GMOs.71
Clearly, consumers have valid reasons to reject GMOs. Should food
containing GMOs say so on the label? In one poll, ninety-three percent of
62. Tokar, supra note 48, at 122.
63. Id.
64. SCHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 98-99.
65. Id. at 99.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 100.
68. Id.
69. Jamie E. Jorg Spence, Right To Know: A Diet of the Future Presently Upon Us, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 1009, 1023-24 (2005).
70. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268), Genetically Modified Food
and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:268:0001:0023:EN:PDF (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
71. Both India and Zambia have rejected food aid from the U.S. because it may be
contaminated with GMOs. Dinesh C. Sharma, India’s Poor Don’t Need GM Aid, BANGKOK
POST (Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://www.agbioworld.org/newsletter_wm/index.php?
caseid=archive&newsid=1611 (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
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respondents thought that the government should require that GMOs be
labeled.72 While the long-term impacts of GMOs are not yet known, must
consumers wait until there is proof sufficient to satisfy the FDA before they
have a right to know of the presence of GMOs in their food?73 Or is the
mere possibility of harm enough to justify a consumer’s right to know?74
Would not the risk of consuming GMOs be more reasonable if it was done
knowingly?75 An act that would require mandatory labeling of GMOs failed
to gain support in Congress.76 However, this Comment argues that
consumers—not the FDA—should be allowed to decide for themselves.
2. Irradiated Foods
Irradiated food is what it sounds like—food that has been bombarded
with ionizing radiation.77 High-energy gamma rays, electron beams, or Xrays, millions of times more powerful than standard medical X-rays, break
apart the bacteria, such as E. coli, that are sometimes found in food.78
Irradiation also destroys vitamins and minerals and kills all living cells in
the irradiated food.79
While irradiated food is not radioactive, eating irradiated foods can have
effects that mimic those of actual radiation exposure.80 Irradiation can
create mutagens.81 Mutagens can cause gene mutations, polyploidy (an
abnormal condition in which cells contain more than two sets of
chromosomes), chromosome aberrations (often associated with cancer), and

72. McGarity, supra note 30, at 138.
73. Peters & Lambert, supra note 26, at 168-69.
74. “Vermont need not, furthermore, take the position that rBST is harmful to require its
disclosure because of potential health risks. The mere fact that it does not know whether
rBST poses hazards is sufficient reason to justify disclosure by reason of the unknown
potential for harm.” Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 76 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996)
(Leval, J., dissenting).
75. “A person’s voluntary embracing of a risky activity or exposure tends to make the
exposure or activity acceptable.” Cranor, supra note 36, at 212.
76. Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 5269, 109th Cong. (2006),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h109-5269 (last visited Nov.
6, 2009).
77. CHRISTINE HOZA FARLOW, D.C., FOOD ADDITIVES: A SHOPPER’S GUIDE TO WHAT’S
SAFE & WHAT’S NOT 22 (rev. ed. 2007).
78. The Center for Food Safety, Food Irradiation, http://truefoodnow.org/
campaigns/food-irradiation (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
79. FARLOW, supra note 77, at 22.
80. Id.
81. The Center for Food Safety, supra note 78.
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dominant lethal mutations (a change in a cell that prevents it from
reproducing in humans cells).82 Also, many mutagens are carcinogens.83
The irradiation process also causes chemical reactions that produce
benzene and formaldehyde, chemicals that are suspected of causing cancer
and birth defects.84 Another study linked colon tumors in lab rats to a
chemical only found in irradiated food.85 In another study, irradiation of
fruit juices caused low-level production of furans, which are similar to
cancer-causing dioxin.86 The FDA has never tested the safety of these
byproducts.87
Irradiation can also diminish vitamin content of food.88 For example,
irradiation can destroy up to eighty percent of vitamin A in eggs, up to
ninety-five percent of vitamin A and lutein in green beans, and forty
percent of beta-carotene in orange juice. Perhaps it is not surprising, then,
that studies show that lab animals fed irradiated food experience stunted
growth.89 Irradiation also doubles the amount of trans fat in beef.90
While irradiation may reduce unwanted pathogens in food, it does not
address the underlying problem—the unsanitary food production that
introduces those pathogens.91 In fact, some critics argue that irradiation
actually creates a disincentive for producers to worry about contamination
prevention, since it allows them to mask the unsanitary practices of factory
farms.92
In 1986, the FDA decided to require labeling of all irradiated foods.93
The decision, it made clear, was “not based on any concern about the safety
of the uses of radiation that are allowed under this final rule.”94 The FDA
apparently is not concerned by a number of studies showing the harmful

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Marion Nestle, New Technologies Supplant Old Precautions with High-Tech
Shortcuts, in FOOD: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 102, 107 (Jan Grover ed., 2008).
92. The Center for Food Safety, supra note 78, at 2.
93. Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg.
13,376, 13,388 (FDA Apr. 18, 1986).
94. Id.
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effects of irradiation on food.95 Instead, the FDA based the decision on the
fact that “consumers view such information as important . . . .”96 The FDA
noted, “The large number of consumer comments requesting retail labeling
attest to the significance placed on such labeling by consumers.”97 It is
important to note that later, the FDA would claim that it did not have
authority under the FDCA to mandate labeling solely on the basis of
consumer interest.98
In 2007, the FDA proposed to change its rule on the labeling of
irradiated food.99 Under the proposed rule, irradiated food would not need
to be labeled unless the irradiation “cause[d] a material change in a food’s
characteristics.”100 For example, if irradiation extended a food’s shelf life
by delaying ripening, the food would have to be labeled.101 The FDA did
not propose to require labeling unless the change in the irradiated food was
not “within the range of characteristics ordinarily found in such foods.”102
The FDA also proposed to allow irradiated foods to be labeled with the
term “pasteurized.”103 This is ironic, since the FDA once argued that
labeling irradiated food as “pasteurized” would be “misleading.”104 The
FDA’s Orwellian explanation was that while past labeling policy focused
on conveying to consumers whether a food had been processed, today the
focus is on the results of the processing rather than the processing itself.105
This rationale rings somewhat hollow. Consumers have long shown an
interest in whether products have been produced in accordance with their
political and social beliefs.106 Hence, there are labels declaring: “Dolphin
95. For a compilation of negative irradiation research, including one 1968 FDA study
where irradiated food caused internal bleeding in rats, see Dr. Joseph Mercola, The Problems
with Irradiated Food: What the Research Says, http://www.mercola.com/article/irradiated/
irradiated_research.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
96. 51 Fed. Reg. at 13,388. This decision is discussed more fully infra Part III.B.
97. 51 Fed. Reg. at 13,388.
98. See infra Part III.B.
99. Irradiation in the Production, Processing and Handling of Food, 72 Fed. Reg.
16,291, 16,294 (FDA proposed Apr. 4, 2007). This is a change from the stance previously
taken by the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the FDA, which held that food
irradiation was a “material fact” that must be reflected on the label. Irradiation of Meat Food
Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,150, 72,157 (FDA Dec. 23, 1999).
100. 72 Fed. Reg. at 16,294.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 16295.
103. Id.
104. Irradiation of Meat Food Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,150, 72,158 (FDA Dec. 23,
1999).
105. 72 Fed. Reg. at 16,295.
106. Peters & Lambert, supra note 26, at 171.
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Safe Tuna,”107 “No Animal Testing,”108 “No HFCs,”109 and “Conflict Free
Diamonds.”110
While the safety of irradiated foods is debatable, consumers are justified
in wanting to know whether their food has been irradiated. If the FDA does
not require labeling of irradiated food, consumers will not have a realistic
means of avoiding it. Again, the government has decided what is safe and is
keeping the consumer in the dark.
3. Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone
Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone (“rBGH”) is a synthetic hormone
given to milk cows to increase their milk output.111 It is the synthetic
version of bovine somatotrophin (“bST”), a naturally occurring bovine
growth hormone produced in the pituitary gland of all cattle.112 A typical
dairy cow’s output can be increased by as much as twenty percent a day
when injected with rBGH.113 The FDA argues that milk from cows that
have been given rBGH is indistinguishable from rBGH-free milk.114
However, there is mounting research that rBGH is not safe.115
rBGH’s adverse effects on cows were described by the court in Stauber
v. Shalala:
107. Tuna labeled as “Dolphin Safe Tuna” was caught using methods that do not harm
dolphins. Dolphin Safe Tuna, http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/ (last
visited Nov. 5, 2009).
108. This label purports to inform the consumer that the product has not been tested on
animals. While some consumer groups are skeptical of this claim, it does show that
consumers have ethical concerns about their products. Bornfreeusa.org, What Do These
Labels Really Mean?, http://www.bornfreeusa.org/articles.php?more=1&p=451 (last visited
Nov. 5, 2009).
109. The “No HFC” label indicates that the producer uses alternative refrigerants that do
not contribute to global warming. Benjerry.com, Ben and Jerry’s: The Cleaner, Greener
Freezer, http://www.benjerry.com/activism/environmental/hc-freezer (last visited Nov. 6,
2009).
110. A diamond is a “Conflict-Free Diamond” if its profits are not used to fund war, and
if it is mined and produced under ethical conditions. The Conflict-Free Diamond Council,
http://www.conflictfreediamonds.org/learnmore.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
111. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n. v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996). Recombinant
Bovine Growth Hormone (“rGBH”) is also known as Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin
(“rBST”). Id.
112. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
113. Christina Cusimano, Comment, RBST, It Does a Body Good?: RBST Labeling and
the Federal Denial of Consumers’ Right to Know, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1095, 1098-99
(2008).
114. Id. at 1096.
115. Id. at 1099-1105.
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Use of [rBGH] may affect cows adversely in several ways.
[rBGH] increases the risks of reduced pregnancy rates, ovarian
cysts and uterine disorders, decreased lengths of gestation
periods and lower birth weight of calves. [rBGH] increases the
risk of retained placentas and twinning rates in cows. It may
cause increased bovine body temperatures, indigestion, bloating,
diarrhea, enlarged hocks, enlarged lesions and injection site
swellings. Additionally, use of [rBGH] increases the risk of
clinical and subclinical mastitis, a bacterial infection of the
udder. In absolute terms, [rBGH] increases the risk of mastitis by
about 0.1 case per cow per year. This risk is less than the risk of
mastitis posed by seasonal change.116
The FDA claims that there are no adverse affects to humans.117 However,
the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) has expressed concern that rBGH
can indirectly lead to an increase in antibiotic residue in milk.118 This risk
arises because rBGH increases the risk of mastitis,119 cows with mastitis are
given antibiotics,120 and this “may lead to high levels of antibiotic residue in
milk,” not to mention increased pus content.121
Critics are also concerned that humans will have allergic reactions to the
increased antibiotics.122 They are also wary about the decreased potency of
antibiotics, such as penicillin, due to an acquired resistance from exposure
to such antibiotics.123 Farmers use over fifty different kinds of antibiotics to
treat mastitis, some of which are not approved for dairy cows.124 The GAO
has concluded that there is no way to assess the degree to which current
milk supplies are contaminated by these drugs.125 The GAO ultimately
recommended that approval of rBGH be withheld until the mastitis issue
could be resolved.126
116. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1183.
117. Id. at 1185.
118. Cusimano, supra note 113, at 1100.
119. Id. One study showed that rBGH increased the risk of mastitis by 25%; another
showed the increase to be 79%. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1101.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1184 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
125. Id.
126. “The increased milk production triggered by the [rBGH] has lead to an outbreak of
mastitis among cows, and increased residues of the antibiotics used to treat this condition
could be showing up in milk and beef. Also, food products from cows treated with the
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rBGH also poses a second threat to human health: insulin-like growth
factor (“IGF-1”).127
[IGF-1] is [a] protein hormone whose production is regulated at
least in part by [bST]. It has the same biochemical composition
in humans and cows and is present in all milk, human saliva and
human digestive juices. [rBGH] increases the amount of IGF-1
in milk. IGF-1 is [removed] in the process of making baby
formula, but it is not destroyed by pasteurization.128
Monsanto, the maker of rBGH, has not conducted any long-term studies on
the effect of increased levels of IGF-1 on humans.129 Nevertheless, FDA
concluded that the small amount of IGF-1 in cow’s milk from rBGH was
unlikely to affect humans.130
Whether out of concern either for human health or for the effect on cows,
consumers have valid reasons to want to know whether their milk was
produced with rBGH.131 Yet under current FDA regulations, rBGH labeling
is voluntary.132 The FDA reasons that “there [is] no significant difference
between milk from treated and untreated cows and, therefore, . . . under the
[FDCA] the agency did not have the authority . . . to require special
labeling . . . .”133
Amazingly, the FDA concluded that consumer’s religious concerns
about GMOs were invalid.134 It recognized that “for religious or cultural
reasons, consumers are interested in being able to identify the source of a
hormone have been commercially processed and sold to consumers without any warning
labels.” Summary of the Government Accountability Office’s Report to Congress, Bovine
Growth Hormone: FDA Approval Should Be Withheld Until the Mastitis Issue Is Resolved
(Aug. 6, 1992), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/PEMD-92-26 (last visited Nov. 5,
2009).
127. Cusimano, supra note 113, at 1102.
128. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1185.
129. Id.
130. Id. For a summary of other research about the danger of rBGH, see Streiffer &
Rubel, supra note 22, at 73.
131. See, e.g., CenterforFoodSafety.com, rBGH/rBST, http://www.centerforfoodsafety.
org/rbgh2.cfm (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (“CFS seeks to force the FDA to remove rBGH /
rBST from the market through all available legal means.”).
132. Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows
That Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279
(Feb. 10, 1994). To this author’s knowledge, no milk producer has yet voluntarily labeled its
milk, “Contains rBGH!”
133. Id.
134. Food Labeling; Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,837,
25,838 (FDA Apr. 28, 1993).
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protein hydrolysate and determined that for these consumers the protein
source of a protein hydrolysate is a material fact.”135 However, the FDA
reasoned that for scientific reasons, those religious concerns were invalid:
When using recombinant DNA techniques, scientists do not
infuse the plant with the original genes that were removed from
the animal. The animal genes are used to produce copies in the
laboratory. Once the copies are transferred to the plant, they
become an integral part of its genetic information, just like
thousands of other genes that are present in the plant
chromosome. There is a scientific basis to conclude that such
genetic alterations do not change the essential nature of the plant,
nor do they confer “animal-like” characteristics to the plant.136
Thus, the FDA purports to decide what is of religious concern, and what is
not. In 2000, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that
the FDA’s GMO policy did not violate the First Amendment because it was
a neutral law of general applicability.137 However, one wonders whether the
FDA’s reasoning could survive the so-called Lemon Test, which prohibits
“excessive government entanglement with religion.”138
Many milk producers, responding to consumer demand for milk free
from artificial hormones, have labeled their milk “No Artificial Growth
Hormones.”139 Monsanto responded to the emerging threat by lobbying
states to ban “rBGH-free” labeling.140 Monsanto argues that such labeling is
misleading because it implies that milk produced with rBGH is inferior.141
135. Id. (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 25,839.
137. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000); see infra
Part III.C.4. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act provides that “Government may
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of
the burden to the person[] is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and[] is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1 (1993).
138. “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted).
139. See, e.g., CSMonitor.com, “Hormone-Free” Milk Spurs Labeling Debate: Some Say
Chemical Company is Behind Efforts To Sink “rBGH-Free” Milk Choice,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2008/0421/p13s01-sten.html. A label that declares
what a food does not contain is called “absence labeling.” “Fat free” and “cholesterol free”
are examples of absence labeling.
140. Andrew Martin, Fighting on a Battlefield the Size of a Milk Label, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 2008, at BU-7. Monsanto hired a Colorado consultant to form the group American
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In Pennsylvania, Monsanto succeeded in persuading the legislature to
ban “rBGH-free” labeling.142 Public outcry was so pronounced that the
legislature reversed itself just one month later.143 Nevertheless, other states
have followed or are following suit. Ohio’s “no rBGH” labeling ban is the
subject of a legal challenge.144 Indiana and New Jersey have similar bans
under consideration in their legislatures.145
Ironically, while states move to ban “rBGH-free” labeling, and the FDA
declares rBGH to be “safe,” Congress’s newly revamped cafeteria proudly
boasts “hormone-free milk.”146 Restaurant Associates, the manager of the
congressional cafeteria, explained on its web site that “Recombinant bovine
Farmers for the Advancement and Conservation of Technology (“AFACT”), which lobbies
legislatures to ban or restrict labels that indicate milk comes from untreated cows. AFACT
claims to be led by dairy farmers, but it was funded and initiated by Monsanto.
141. Id. This argument has also been made by the FDA. Interim Guidance on the
Voluntary Labeling of Milk in Milk Products from Cows That Have Not Been Treated with
Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279 (FDA Feb. 10, 1994). However, this
is a dubious argument in light of Tylka v. Gerber, No. 96 C 1647, 1999 WL 495126 (N.D.
Ill. 1999). In that case, plaintiffs argued that Gerber’s claims, including “Nutritionally, you
can't buy a better baby food than Gerber” were false and misleading advertising, since
Gerber was using ingredients, such as starch and sugar, which rendered their products less
nutritious than other brands. Id. at *2. The court held:
Nutrition is a nebulous concept, although quantifiable in some respects.
With respect to the use of the term in Gerber’s advertisements, it cannot be said
that the term reasonably misleads consumers. . . . Statements such as . . .
“[n]utritionally, you can’t buy a better food than Gerber,” . . . add little to the
daily informational barrage to which consumers are exposed. These statements
fall within the supermarket sales pitch; they address such a large market that
they bespeak caution, and should put the reasonable consumer on alert that the
comments are meaningless sales patter.
Id. at *8.
142. Id.
143. Jane Akre, Public Outcry Keeps Hormone Milk Labels in Pennsylvania, RACHEL’S
DEMOCRACY & HEALTH NEWS, Jan. 24, 2008.
144. Andrew Martin, Consumers Won’t Know What They’re Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
11, 2007, § 3, at 8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/business/11feed (last
visited Dec. 3, 2009).
145. Andrew Martin, Fighting on a Battlefield the Size of a Milk Label, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 2008, at BU-7. This author questions whether absence labeling bans could withstand the
scrutiny announced in 44 Liquormart: “The First Amendment directs us to be especially
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government
perceives to be their own good.” 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
Perhaps this is why the FDA and FTC refused to ban GMO absence labeling when
petitioned to do so by Monsanto. See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
146. Marion Burros, More House Salads, Whether the House Likes It or Not, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2008.
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growth hormone, or rBGH, is injected into dairy cows to artificially
increase their milk production. The hormone has not been properly tested
for safety. Milk labeled rBGH-free is produced by dairy cows that never
received injections of this hormone.”147
This pronouncement did not escape the ire of dairy industry lobbyists,
who demanded that the web site be changed—which it has.148
So, while Congress sips rBGH-free milk in its own cafeteria, for the rest
of us, rBGH labeling is voluntary, and in some states, rBGH absence
labeling is forbidden. Considering, however, the fact that rBGH milk is
banned in much of the world149 (as well as the congressional cafeteria), the
GAO’s recommendation that it not be approved, and the many studies
warning of its dangers, it seems that the American consumer is justified in
wanting to know whether his milk was produced with rBGH.
III. THE FDA’S REGULATION OF FOOD LABELING
A. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
The FDA’s authority to regulate food labeling derives from the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Section 403 of the FDCA provides that a
food shall be deemed misbranded if “its labeling is false or misleading in
any particular . . . .”150 Section 201 provides that in determining whether a
label is misleading,
there shall be taken into account (among other things) . . . the
extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts
material in the light of such representations or material with
respect to consequences which may result from the use of the
article to which the labeling . . . relates under the conditions of
use prescribed in the labeling . . . thereof or under such
conditions of use as are customary or usual.151
Section 201 has two prongs. First, it requires that if a manufacturer opts to
tell something about its product, it must tell the whole truth and provide all

147. Id.
148. The web site now reads: “Milk produced without synthetic rBGH is produced by
dairy cows that never received injections of synthetic bovine growth hormone.” Id.
149. Peters & Lambert, supra note 26, at 173.
150. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1938).
151. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1938).
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of the material information.152 Second, it requires disclosure of facts that are
“material” to the “consequences” of consuming a food.153
B. The FDA’s Interpretation of the FDCA
Under the current FDA policy, a fact is only considered material in two
contexts: when it relates to an increased risk to consumer safety;154 or when
it relates to a “material consequence,” such as a change in a food’s
organoleptic,155 nutritional, or functional properties “that would not be
noticeable at the point of purchase but could be apparent when consumed or
cooked.”156 Of course, whether there is an increased risk to consumer safety
is determined by the regulator, and that decision will receive deference
from a reviewing court because the reasoning behind labeling decisions are
“characterized by scientific and technological uncertainty.”157
However, the FDA has not always held that materiality is a condition
precedent to considering consumer interest. As discussed supra Part II.B.2,
the FDA has previously mandated labeling, based solely on consumer
interest. In its 1986 decision to mandate labeling for all irradiated food, the
FDA stated, “Whether information is material under section 201(n) of the
act depends not on the abstract worth of the information but on whether
consumers view such information as important and whether the omission of
label information may mislead a consumer.”158 The FDA reasoned that the
“FDA has historically required the disclosure of a food processing agent
whenever it is material to the processing of foods.”159 It reasoned that if
flour must be labeled as “bleached” when bleaching agents are used in
processing, or as “bromated” when potassium bromate is used in the

152. Degnan, supra note 15, at 20.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 8 (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 13679 (Apr. 6, 1984) (pertaining to the FDA
requirement in 21 C.F.R. § 101.17(d)(1) that a special warning statement appear on the label
of protein products intended for use in weight reduction due to health risks associated with
very low calorie diets)).
155. An organoleptic difference is one capable of being detected by a human sense
organ. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1193 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
156. Id.; see also Irradiation in the Production, Processing and Handling of Food, 72 Fed.
Reg. 16,291, 16,293 (FDA proposed Apr. 4, 2007).
157. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
158. Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg.
13,376, 13,388 (FDA Apr. 18, 1986) (emphasis added).
159. Id.
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processing, then irradiated food should be labeled as irradiated, if
irradiation is used in processing.160
The FDA also gave other examples where it has mandated labeling, not
because of the “abstract worth of the information,” i.e., safety concerns or
organoleptic changes, but rather based solely on “whether consumers view
such information as important and whether the omission of label
information may mislead a consumer.”161 The FDA noted that it had
required labeling where a food is enriched or fortified, where orange juice
is made from a previously concentrated ingredient, or where orange juice
has been pasteurized.162 The FDA further noted that manufacturers of
“[p]otato chips made from dehydrated potatoes, onion rings made from
minced onions, and fish sticks made from minced fish are all required to
disclose these material differences in processing.”163
The FDA has also proposed mandating labeling due to religious and
cultural concerns.164 Consumers asked the FDA, for religious and cultural
reasons, to require that labels state whether a protein hydrolysate is derived
from animals or plants.165 The FDA recognized that, “for religious or
cultural reasons, some consumers wish to avoid foods or food ingredients
that are of animal origin because their dietary convictions prohibit or
discourage the consumption of such foods.”166 The FDA, therefore,
proposed a rule that would mandate labeling, concluding, “[T]he food
source of a protein hydrolysate is information of material importance for a
person who desires to avoid certain foods for religious or cultural
reasons.”167 The FDA later backtracked on this proposed rule.168
If the FDA requires labeling in all of these situations, then it would seem
perfectly consistent for the FDA to require labeling of GMOs, or of milk
from cows that have been treated with rBGH. Thus, while the FDA
currently claims that it does not have authority under the FDCA to mandate
labeling based solely on consumer interest, this seems a dubious claim.169
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Food Labeling; Declaration of Ingredients, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,592, 28,600 (FDA
proposed June 21, 1991).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
169. Accord Streiffer & Rubel, supra note 22, at 68 (“[C]laiming that the FDA’s
authority is limited to requiring those kinds of information is inconsistent with the plain
language of the FDCA itself.”) (internal citations omitted); McGarity supra note 30, at 139
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C. When Is a Label Misleading?: Legal Challenges to FDA Labeling
Policy
1. Chevron Deference
Stauber v. Shalala and Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, discussed
infra, demonstrate the deference that courts afford administrative agencies.
An agency’s statutory interpretation does not receive deference when
Congress has spoken directly to the issue; in such a case, the will of
Congress must be given effect.170 However, where Congress has not
specifically addressed the issue, agencies receive considerable deference; a
court does not substitute its own judgment, but merely decides whether the
agency’s answer is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”171
Further, courts give “substantial deference” when an agency is interpreting
its own enabling statute.172 Additionally, agency decisions requiring
scientific judgment receive even further judicial deference.173 And finally,
common law rules of evidence require that reviewing courts confine
themselves to the record that was before the agency, which forecloses
challengers from bringing additional evidence showing the need for
labeling.174 Taken together, as demonstrated in Stauber and Alliance for
Bio-Integrity, these rules stack the deck overwhelmingly in favor of the
regulator. As a result, as the following cases demonstrate, any agency
policy that is challenged in court is almost certain to be upheld.
2. Central Hudson Scrutiny
Regulation of food labels is a restriction on commercial speech, which
must meet the Central Hudson test. Under Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, a court reviewing government
restriction on food labeling must determine: “(1) whether the expression
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) whether the
(arguing that the FDA could mandate labeling based solely on the fact that without a GMO
label, a food will appear to be something that it is not, i.e, a food derived from nonengineered plants); see discussion infra Part IV.A. But see Degnan, supra note 15, at 27
(arguing that the FDA does not have authority to mandate labeling unless it determines that
there is a safety concern).
170. “First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
171. Id.
172. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 (D.D.C. 2000).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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government’s interest is substantial; (3) whether the labeling law directly
serves the asserted interest; and (4) whether the labeling law is no more
extensive than necessary.”175 The burden of proof is on the defendant to
justify its labeling restriction, and that burden is not slight.176 Thus,
legislatures receive scrutiny, while unelected bureaucrats receive
deference.177
This Part will next review three examples of labeling decisions that were
subjected to judicial review. In the following examples, the FDA’s labeling
decisions will receive deference and be upheld, while a state legislature’s
labeling decision will receive scrutiny and be overturned.
3. Stauber v. Shalala
In Stauber v. Shalala, a group of milk consumers challenged the FDA’s
refusal to require mandatory labeling of milk from rBGH-injected cows.178
Plaintiffs argued that consumer interest alone could suffice to justify
mandatory labeling.179 The court refused to hear evidence of the danger of
rBGH that had not been presented to the FDA.180 Applying an arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, it held that a finding of a material difference
is a condition precedent to considering consumer interest.181 Consumer
interest is only relevant upon
a determination that a product differs materially from the type of
product it purports to be. If there is a difference, and consumers
would likely want to know about the difference, then labeling is
appropriate. . . . In the absence of evidence of a material
difference between rBST-derived milk and ordinary milk, the
use of consumer demand as the rationale for labeling would
violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.182
The court cited no authority for this proposition except to note that this was
the opinion of the FDA.183 Thus, the Stauber court, following controlling
175. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980)).
176. Id.
177. See supra Part III.C.1.
178. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
179. Id. at 1193.
180. Id. at 1189.
181. Id. at 1193.
182. Id.
183. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1193. The court did not discuss the FDA’s 1986 assertion
that it had authority to label solely on the basis of consumer interest. See generally id.
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U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding deference to agencies, elevated an
informal FDA policy to a rule of law: the FDA may not consider consumer
interest in labeling decisions unless it first determines that a product differs
materially from the type of product it purports to be.184
4. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala
In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, a coalition of groups and
individuals, including scientists and religious leaders concerned about
genetically altered foods, challenged the FDA’s refusal to require
mandatory labeling of GMOs as arbitrary and capricious.185 They also
raised challenges under the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).186 The “[p]laintiffs produced several documents
showing significant disagreements among scientific experts” regarding the
safety of GMOs.187 Like Stauber, however, the court confined itself to the
record that was before the agency.188
The plaintiffs argued that in its labeling decision, the “FDA should have
considered the widespread consumer interest in having genetically
engineered foods labeled, as well as the special concerns of religious groups
and persons with allergies in having these foods labeled.”189 The court held,
however, that the FDA’s exclusion of consumer interest from the factors
that determine whether a change is “material” constitutes a reasonable
interpretation of the statute, and therefore is valid.190 The court cited to
Stauber, opining that a finding of a material difference is a condition
precedent to considering consumer interest.191 It therefore held that because
the “FDA has already determined that, in general, rDNA modification does
not ‘materially’ alter foods . . . . [Thus,] the FDA lacks a basis upon which
it can legally mandate labeling, regardless of the level of consumer
demand.”192 Thus, what began as an informal FDA policy became the rule
of law in the influential D.C. Circuit.
The court rejected the Free Exercise argument, citing Employment
Division v. Smith, because, it said, the FDA’s policy was a neutral law of

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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general applicability.193 The court also rejected the RFRA challenge
because the plaintiff’s religious beliefs were not “substantially
burdened.”194
5. International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy
In International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, a group of dairy
manufacturers brought First Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges
to a Vermont statute requiring dairy manufacturers to identify products
which were, or might have been, derived from dairy cows treated with a
synthetic growth hormone used to increase milk production.195 The Amestoy
court gave little deference to the Vermont legislature,196 holding that it had
not satisfied the second prong of the Central Hudson test, which requires
that the state have a substantial interest in regulating the commercial
speech.197 The court held that “consumer curiosity alone is not a strong
enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual
statement.”198 The court reasoned that if consumer interest alone were
enough to compel labeling, there would be no end to the information
manufacturers may be required to disclose.199 The court suggested that
instead “consumers interested in such information should exercise the
power of their purses by buying products from manufacturers who
voluntarily reveal it.”200
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Pierre Leval argued that Vermont’s concern
was substantial and went beyond mere consumer interest, including:
(1) They consider the use of a genetically-engineered hormone in
the production unnatural; (2) they believe that use of the
hormone will result in increased milk production and lower milk
prices, thereby hurting small dairy farmers; (3) they believe that
193. “Because it is not disputed that the Statement of Policy is neutral and generally
applicable, Plaintiff’s Free Exercise Claim must fail.” Id. at 179-80 (citing Emp. Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
194. “While the Court recognizes the potential inconvenience the lack of labeling
presents for Plaintiffs, Defendant’s decision to mandate labeling of genetically modified
foods does not ‘substantially’ burden Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.” Id. at 181.
195. Int’l Dairy Foods Assoc. v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
196. McGarity, supra note 30, at 146.
197. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 73. One wonders if the result would have been different if it had
been the FDA requiring labeling, rather than the Vermont legislature. The FDA would have
been entitled to Chevron deference. See supra Part III.C.1.
198. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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the use of rBST is harmful to cows and potentially harmful to
humans; and, (4) they feel that there is a lack of knowledge
regarding the long-term effects of rBST.201
Leval argued, “The mere fact that [Vermont] does not know whether
rBST poses hazards is sufficient reason to justify disclosure by reason of
the unknown potential for harm.”202 He pointed out that while the FDA’s
studies of rBST may have been thorough, “they could not cover long-term
effects of rBST on humans.”203
He argued that the primary function of the First Amendment is to
“advance truthful disclosure.”204 The true objective of the plaintiffs, Leval
argued, is “concealment,” which “has little entitlement to protection under
the First Amendment.”205
The real issue, Leval wrote, is “whether the First Amendment prohibits
government from requiring disclosure of truthful relevant information to
consumers.”206 To invoke the First Amendment to invalidate a law
requiring disclosure of information to consumers, Leval argued, “stands the
Amendment on its ear.”207 Leval detailed at length the U.S. Supreme
Court’s commitment to “the free flow of commercial information,” citing
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.208
Leval also took issue with the majority’s contention that “because the
FDA has not found health risks in this new procedure, health worries could
not be considered ‘real’ or ‘cognizable.’”209
[T]here are many possible reasons why a government agency
might fail to find real health risks, including inadequate time and
budget for testing, insufficient advancement of scientific
techniques, insufficiently large sampling populations, pressures
from industry, and simple human error.
To suggest that a government agency’s failure to find a
health risk in a short-term study of a new genetic technology
201. Id. at 75-76 (Leval, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 76.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 80.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 74.
208. Id. at 80-81 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
209. Id.
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should bar a state from requiring simple disclosure of the use of
that technology where its citizens are concerned about such
health risks would be unreasonable and dangerous.210
Leval pointed out the government’s poor track record in determining
product safety.211 He reasoned that “a government agency’s conclusion
regarding a product’s safety, reached after limited study, is not a guarantee
and does not invalidate public concern for unknown side effects.”212
Finally, Leval comforted himself by noting the narrowness of the holding:
“it applies only to cases where a state disclosure requirement is supported
by no interest other than the gratification of consumer curiosity.”213
The plaintiffs in Amestoy also argued that the Vermont statute violated
the Commerce Clause because the mandatory labeling would impede the
free flow of interstate commerce.214 While the court did not reach the
Commerce Clause argument, the Commerce Clause may prove a potent
obstacle to consumers’-right-to-know labeling laws at the state level.215
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Can FDA Mandate Food Labeling Based Solely on Consumer Interest?
In 1986, the answer was yes. At that time, the FDA claimed authority
under sections 403(a), 201(n), and 409 of the FDCA to mandate food
labeling based on consumer interest alone.216 In 1994, the FDA said the
answer was no, and this has been elevated to a rule of law.217 Had the 1986
irradiation decision to mandate labeling of irradiated food been challenged
in court, the FDA presumably would have argued that consumer interest is
sufficient to give it the authority to mandate labeling under the FDCA. The
reviewing court would have applied the same deference as the Stauber
court and the Alliance for Bio-Integrity court, and as a result, the 1986
policy would have been elevated to a rule of law. But unfortunately for
210. Id. at 77.
211. “In studying the frequency and seriousness of risks identified after approval, GAO
found that of the 198 drugs approved by FDA between 1976 and 1985 for which data were
available, 102 (or 51.5 percent) had serious post-approval risks, as evidenced by labeling
changes or withdrawal from the market.” Id. at 77.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 81.
214. Id. at 69 (majority opinion).
215. Id. at 70.
216. See supra Part II.B.2; see also Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and
Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,376, 13,388 (FDA Apr. 18, 1986).
217. See supra Part III.
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consumer rights advocates, that did not happen. This raises the question,
was the FDA wrong in 1986, or has it just changed its mind? Why did the
FDA change policies from 1986 to 1994?218
In 2007, the FDA answered this question as it explained why it was
proposing to reverse its 1986 policy, which mandated labeling of irradiated
foods.219 The FDA stated, “In the past, FDA policies on irradiation labeling
have focused on the fact that the food has been processed. . . . In recent
years, FDA policies on the labeling of foods have focused on the results of
the processing of the food rather than the processing itself.”220 Thus, the
FDA’s turnaround on irradiated food labeling was triggered by a shift in
policy, not by a lack of jurisdiction under the FDCA. The FDA has not
argued that its 1986 policy was wrong, only that it has shifted its focus. The
conclusion, therefore, is that the 1986 policy was a permissible
interpretation of the FDCA; the FDA does have authority to mandate
labeling based on consumer interest.221
While the FDA’s labeling policy may have changed, the FDCA has not.
Thus, if the FDCA allowed the FDA to make labeling policy on the basis of
consumer interest in 1986, then it has the legal authority to do so today. It
may be unwilling to do so for various reasons, but it is disingenuous for the
FDA to claim that it does not have authority under the FDCA to do so,222
since it has claimed legal authority to do so in the past.223

218. The FDA’s 1992 policy stated in Alliance for Bio-Integrity was the policy
challenged in Stauber. See Stauber, 895 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (citing
Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows That
Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed Reg. 6279, 6280
(FDA Feb. 10, 1994) (“In addition, the agency found that there was no significant difference
between milk from treated and untreated cows and, therefore, concluded that under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the act), the agency did not have the authority in this
situation to require special labeling for milk from rbST-treated cows.”)).
219. Irradiation in the Production, Processing and Handling of Food, 72 Fed. Reg.
16,291, 16,295 (FDA Apr. 4, 2007).
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. See supra note 158.
222. This was the FDA’s position in Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1193; see also Interim
Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows That Have Not
Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279 (FDA Feb. 10,
1994) (“In addition, the agency found that there was no significant difference between milk
from treated and untreated cows and, therefore, concluded that under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the act), the agency did not have the authority in this situation to
require special labeling for milk from rBST-treated cows.”).
223. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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One further question remains: the Stauber court and the Alliance for BioIntegrity court elevated the 1994 policy into a rule of law—does this mean
that the FDA’s 1986 interpretation cannot be revived?
Whether an agency that has been upheld by a court can reverse itself and
still be entitled to Chevron deference is a question not yet addressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court.224 However, we do know that agency decisions trump
prior judicial interpretation, as long as they would otherwise qualify for
Chevron deference.225 The FDA shifted its interpretation of the FDCA once
from 1986 to 1994 and it was upheld—why could it not shift again? After
all, regulators receive heightened deference when interpreting their own
enabling statute.226
Heightened deference, however, is no guarantee of success in court. The
majority in Amestoy, for example, showed little regard for the Vermont
legislature when the majority concluded that Vermont’s “sole interest” in
passing its rBST labeling statute had been “consumer curiosity,” when in
fact the people of Vermont had cited multiple reasons, including “concerns
about human health, cow health, biotechnology, and the survival of small
dairy farms of Vermont.”227 Given the judicial branch’s unpredictableness
when it comes to deference, it is not clear whether the FDA could go back
to its 1986 interpretation without being overturned. Advocates of the
consumer’s right to know, therefore, would be wiser to seek relief in
Congress, rather than the courts. If Congress amends the FDCA to require
regulators to consider the consumer’s right to know, the FDA could no
longer argue that it did not have authority to base labeling decision
thereupon.

224. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Agency Action in 9 ENGAGE: J. FED. SOC.
PRACTICE GROUPS 3, 18 (2008).
225. Id. (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 982 (2005)).
226. See supra note 74.
227. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 76 (2nd Cir. 1996) (Leval, J.,
dissenting).
[The majority] simply disregards the evidence of Vermont’s true interests and
the district court's findings recognizing those interests. Nowhere does the
majority opinion discuss or even mention the evidence or findings regarding
the people of Vermont’s concerns about human health, cow health,
biotechnology, and the survival of small dairy farms.
Id.
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B. Stauber, Alliance for Bio-Integrity, & Amestoy—Wrongly Decided?: A
Critique
The outcomes of Stauber and Alliance for Bio-Integrity were unfortunate
for consumer rights advocates. However, both courts applied controlling
precedent requiring substantial deference to agency decisions. When a court
follows the law, it should be praised, not criticized. One could argue,
however, that those courts should have considered the constitutional rights
of a third party—the consumer.
As Judge Leval argued in Amestoy, to use the First Amendment to deny
“disclosure of information consumers reasonably desire stands the
Amendment on its ear.”228 “The benefit the First Amendment confers in the
area of commercial speech,” Leval argued, “is the provision of accurate,
non-misleading, relevant information to consumers.”229 In light of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s holdings in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
Leval may be right.230
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court struck down a ban
preventing pharmacies from advertising drug prices.231 The Court began its
discussion with the principle that: “Freedom of speech presupposes a
willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, . . . the protection afforded is to
the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”232 The Court
reasoned that “information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the
best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them.”233 The Court held that Virginia may not accomplish its
interests by “keeping the public in ignorance . . . .”234
While Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, which dealt with suppression
of speech, is distinguishable from the question considered by this
Comment—whether commercial speech can be compelled in the name of
the consumer’s right to know—the principle is the same: the recipient of

228. Id. at 74.
229. Id. at 81.
230. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
231. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
232. Id. at 756 (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 770.
234. Id.
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speech has a protected First Amendment interest and the government may
not protect consumers by keeping them ignorant.235
In 44 Liquormart, the Court struck down a state law that prevented
liquor stores from advertising their prices.236 The Court reasoned that:
The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good. That teaching
applies equally to state attempts to deprive consumers of
accurate information about their chosen products: . . . “Some of
the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But the
general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the
government, assess the value of the information presented.”237
While 44 Liquormart, like Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, addressed a
ban on speech, not compelled labeling, the Court in both cases opined that
courts should be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people
in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.
The Court has made clear, therefore, that recipients of commercial
speech have a First Amendment right in receiving it, and courts should be
skeptical of regulations that paternalistically prevent consumers from being
provided with truthful information. The Stauber court and the Alliance for
Bio-Integrity court can, therefore, be justifiably criticized for failing to
consider the consumers’ First Amendment right to receive access to the
speech they demanded. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
a reviewing court must hold FDA regulations that violate the Constitution
to be invalid.238
There is considerable support, therefore, for the view that Stauber,
Alliance for Bio-Integrity, and Amestoy were wrongly decided. However,
while a consumer’s right to know might be protected by the First
Amendment, no court has squarely held so. Future courts are unlikely to
make the jurisprudential leap argued for by Judge Leval. It is much safer to
follow the path of Stauber and Alliance for Bio-Integrity. Furthermore, state

235. Id.
236. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996).
237. Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767
(1993)).
238. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . contrary to constitutional
right . . . .”).
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legislatures are not the places to vindicate the consumer’s right to know, as
Amestoy demonstrates.239 Congress, therefore, is the consumer’s best hope.
V. PROPOSAL
Others have looked at individual situations where the consumer’s right to
know has been denied and have proposed solutions that would only apply to
those specific situations.240 This Comment proposes a global solution that
would require food regulators to consider what consumers reasonably want
to know in every food labeling decision.
This Comment proposes that Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause
power, amend section 201(n) of the FDCA to provide that: in determining
whether a label is misleading, “there shall be taken into account the extent
to which the labeling fails to reveal material facts that consumers
reasonably desire to know . . . .” Admittedly, one can envision several
criticisms of this proposal. This Part will attempt to anticipate and address
the most obvious of them.
A. Criticisms Addressed
1. A “Reasonably Desire” Standard Is Too Vague and Invites
Litigation
Critics will argue that the proposed statutory language is too vague—
how can a court determine whether a fact is one that consumers “reasonably
desire to know”? What this critic desires is a bright line rule. However, not
everything in law lends itself to a bright line rule. Tort law has its “ordinary
person”; contract law has its implied obligation of “good faith effort”; and
corporate law has its “business judgment rule.” All are vague standards; all
invite litigation; yet all are deeply rooted in American law. Sometimes the
law must eschew factors, bright line rules, and balancing tests in favor of
reasonableness. It has done so successfully for hundreds of years; it can do
so again here.

239. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1996). The
interstate Commerce Clause may represent a potential barrier to the enactment and
enforcement of state consumer right to know legislation.
240. See, e.g., Cusimano, supra note 113, at 1121-24 (proposing that Congress mandate
labeling of rBST products); Emily Robertson, Note, Finding a Compromise in the Debate
Over Genetically Modified Food: An Introduction to a Model State Consumer Right-ToKnow Act, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 156, 170-76 (2003) (proposing a model act requiring
disclosure of GMOs).
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2. There Will Be No End to the Amount of Information That
Consumers Will Demand
The majority in Amestoy argued that:
Were consumer interest alone sufficient, there is no end to the
information that states could require manufacturers to disclose
about their production methods. For instance, with respect to
cattle, consumers might reasonably evince an interest in knowing
which grains herds were fed, with which medicines they were
treated, or the age at which they were slaughtered.241
Several responses are possible to this critique. First, one could respond—
so what? If consumers reasonably want to know it, an aversion to clutter is
not a sufficient justification to deny them the access to pertinent
information.
Second, there is a limit to what consumers will demand. As discussed
supra Part II, there are valid reasons why a consumer would want to know
whether milk comes from rBGH-injected cows. As of yet, no bills have
been proposed, no lawsuits have been filed, and no petitions have been
drafted, to compel slaughter age labeling, as the Amestoy majority mused.242
Thus, the concern of the Amestoy majority is likely a non-issue; consumers
will clamor for labeling of facts that are actually important to them, not
trivialities.
Third, one could argue that this concern has a positive externality: the
threat of compelled labeling will prevent manufacturers from putting things
in their products that consumers would not want to consume. For example,
the threat of compelled labeling might prevent liverwurst makers from
including “snouts and ears” in their product.243 The free flow of
information, aided by mandatory labeling, will make sellers more
responsive to the desires of consumers—hardly a bad thing.

241. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74.
242. Id.
243. See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 57 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, Circuit J.).
Frankfurter labeling need not include esophagus even in the statement of
ingredients. The fastidious reader will be comforted to know, however,
that snouts and ears cannot be included unless the product name contains
the phrase “with variety meats” or “with by-products.” Not so, of course,
with liver sausage (liverwurst), where one takes his chances.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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3. Voluntary Labeling Is Sufficient To Protect Consumer Interests
The Amestoy majority argued that the consumer’s right to know can be
vindicated by market forces—consumers “should exercise the power of
their purses by buying products from manufacturers who voluntarily reveal
it.”244 The case for voluntarily labeling is compelling.245 However, it
ignores the ugly reality that industry vigorously fights voluntary labeling in
order to protect its own interests.
One dairy in Maine, citing the consumer’s right to know, labeled its
milk, “Our farmer’s pledge: no artificial hormones.”246 Monsanto sued,
arguing that the dairy’s label implied its milk was superior, an inference
that harmed Monsanto’s business. That lawsuit was settled,247 but one can
imagine the chilling effect on voluntary labeling.
In Oregon, biotech corporations spent $5.3 million to successfully defeat
a ballot initiative that would have required mandatory labeling of GMOs.248
Proponents of the initiative were only able to raise $200,000.249
In February 2007, Monsanto petitioned the Federal Trade Commission
and the FDA to “stop deceptive milk labeling and advertising.”250 The
request was denied.251 However, since then, Monsanto has sought to protect
itself from voluntary labeling by lobbying for state legislative bans.252 In

244. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74.
245. See, e.g., Peters & Lambert, supra note 26, at 174 (arguing that voluntary labeling
enhances consumer autonomy at lower costs than a mandatory labeling scheme).
246. Kristen Philipkoski, Monsanto v. Oakhurst Dairy: Does Monsanto Corporation
Have the Right to Keep You from Knowing the Contents of Your Food? (originally published
in Wired Magazine, 2003), http://reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate_speech/monsanto_
oakhurst_wired.html.
247. “The case was settled in 2003 when Oakhurst agreed to include language on its
labels that explains that the FDA had found no significant difference between milk from
cows that were given the hormone, and those that did not get the hormone.” Stephen J.
Hedges, “Hormone Free” Milk Churns Up Quite a Stir, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 23,
2007, at P1D.
248. Clark Wolf, Labeling Genetically Engineered Foods: Rights, Risks, Interests, and
Institutional Options, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND
LEGAL DEBATE 178, 178-79 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007).
249. Id. at 179.
250. Press Release, Monsanto, Federal Agencies Advised of Misleading Milk Labels and
Advertising (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.organicconsumers.org/artman2/uploads/1/FDA_
FTC_FINAL_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
251. Kara Sissell, FTC Refuses Monsanto’s Request for Dairy Inquiry, CHEMICAL WK.,
Sept. 12, 2007, at 45.
252. On this, Judge Leval was prophetic. He stated that “certain states, no doubt
influenced by the rBST lobby, will ‘not allow any labeling concerning rBST.’” Int’l Dairy
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October 2007, the Pennsylvania Agriculture Department, at Monsanto’s
request, banned labeling milk as free from rBGH.253 However, in January
2008, “a bombardment of consumer emails, letters and calls” persuaded the
Governor to intervene and reverse the ban before it went into effect.254 As
of March 2008, bans were being considered in New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana,
Kansas, Utah, Missouri, and Vermont.255 Thus, one can see that voluntary
labeling is not a viable solution.
In August 2008, Monsanto agreed to sell its rBGH business to Eli
Lilly.256 It remains to be seen whether Eli Lilly will continue Monsanto’s
aggressive campaign against voluntary labeling. What is clear, however, is
that when hundreds of millions of dollars in profits are on the line,257 the
power of the purse alone is not sufficient to vindicate the consumer’s right
to know.
4. Does It Pass the Central Hudson Test?
The amendment to the FDCA proposed by this Comment would likely
be considered a restriction on commercial speech, since, in some cases, it
would force manufacturers to “speak” when they would prefer to remain
silent. As discussed supra Part III.C.2, restrictions on commercial speech
must pass the Central Hudson test: “(1) the food labeling regulation must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the government’s interest
must be substantial; (3) the labeling law must directly serve the asserted
interest; and (4) the labeling law must be no more extensive than
necessary.”258
Critics will argue that the proposed amendment would fail this test.
However, as this Comment has laid out above, there are ample moral,
ethical, religious, and health reasons why consumers might desire certain

Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 80 n.6 (2d Cir. 1996) (Leval, J., dissenting) (quoting
Affidavit of Ben Cohen at 3-4).
253. Jane Akre, Public Outcry Keeps Hormone Milk Labels in PA, Jan. 19, 2008,
http://www.injuryboard.com/national-news/public-outcry-keeps-hormone-milk-labels-inpa.aspx?googleid=29144; see also Dan Shapley, Pennsylvania Allows Hormone-Free Milk
Labelling: Monsanto is Lobbying States to Restrict Labelling, THE DAILY GREEN, Jan. 17,
2008, http://www.thedailygreen.com/healthy-eating/eat-safe/hormone-free-milk-47011701.
254. Akre, supra note 253.
255. Andrew Martin, Fighting on a Battlefield the Size of a Milk Label, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 2008, at BU-7.
256. Daily Briefing, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 21, 2008, at 2B.
257. Id.
258. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
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information to appear on a label.259 And, as the representative of the people,
when consumer concerns are material and reasonable, the government can
be said to have a substantial interest in mandating labeling. Even critics
would likely agree that mandatory labeling would directly advance this
interest. Further, if a mandatory labeling regulation is crafted reasonably, it
should easily pass the fourth prong, which requires that the regulation be no
more extensive than necessary. Therefore, it seems that the amendment to
the FDCA proposed by this Comment would easily survive Central Hudson
scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the current law, regulators need not, and generally do not,
consider consumer interest as a factor in deciding what must go on a label.
However, the consumer’s right to know, which is rooted in the First
Amendment, requires that this situation be rectified. Due to unfavorable
jurisprudence in the courts of appeals, unsympathetic regulators, and
Commerce Clause issues, consumer interest litigation is unlikely to rectify
this problem. The best way to vindicate the consumer’s right to know,
therefore, is for Congress to amend the FDCA to require regulators to take
into account the extent to which the labeling fails to reveal material facts
that consumers reasonably desire to know.
Scientists will continue to develop more ways to manipulate food. These
new technologies will continue to raise religious, moral, ethical, health, and
safety issues. The consumer’s right to know about his food will be an
increasingly important issue. While mandatory labeling is often contrary to
the interests of the food industry, the U.S. Constitution has made the choice
for us—the First Amendment requires the government to protect the
consumer’s right to receive accurate, non-misleading information the
consumer reasonably desires to know.

259. See supra Part II.B.1.

